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Abstract: Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are vulnerable to security threats due to the inherent
characteristics of such networks. It is difficult to provide trusted and secure communications in adversarial
environments. In MANETs there is a need of a anonymous communication that can be described as a
combination of unidentifiability and unlinkability. Although a number of anonymous secure routing
protocols have been proposed, the requirements are not fully satisfied. The existing protocol are vulnerable
to fake routing packets or Denial of Service(DOS) broadcasting. The new Protocol Authenticated
Anonymous Secure Routing (AASR), focus on the MANETs in adversarial environments. It adopt a key
encryption onion to record a discovered route and it uses group signature to authenticate the RREQ packet
per hop, to prevent intermediate nodes from modifying the routing packets. In this paper, we provide
Anonymous Secure Routing Protocol for Inter Domain MANETs.
Keywords: AASR, Onion Routing, Mobile Ad hoc Networks.
1. Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are
vulnerable to securitythreats due to the inherent
characteristics of such networks,such as the open
wireless medium and dynamic topology. Itis
difficult to provide trusted and secure
communications inadversarial environments, such
as battlefields. On one hand,the adversaries
outside a network may infer the informationabout
the communicating nodes or traffic flows by
passivetraffic observation, even if the
communications are encrypted.
On the other hand, the nodes inside the network
cannotbe always trusted, since a valid node may
be captured byenemies and becomes malicious.
As a result, anonymouscommunications are
important for MANETs in
adversarialenvironments, in which the nodes
identifications and routesare replaced by random
numbers or pseudonyms for
protectionpurpose.Anonymity is defined as the
state of being unidentifiablewithin a set of
subjects. In MANETs, the requirements
ofanonymous communications can be described as
a combinationof unindentifiability and
unlinkability [1]. Unindentifiabilitymeans that the
identities of the source and destination nodes
cannot be revealed to other nodes. Unlinkability
means thatthe route and traffic flows betwee the
source and destinationnodes cannot be recognized
or the two nodes cannot be linked.The key to
implementing the anonymous communications
isto develop appropriate anonymous secure
routing protocols.In this work, we focus on the
MANETs in adversarialenvironments, where the
public and group key can be initiallydeployed in
the mobile nodes. We assume that there is no
onlinesecurity or localization service available
when the networkis deployed. We propose an
authenticated anonymous securerouting (AASR)
to overcome the pre-mentioned problems.
2. Literature Survey
2.1 Cryptography and Network Security using
Trapdoors.
common mechanisms that is widelyused in
anonymous secure routing is Trapdoor. In
cryptographic functions, a trapdoor is acommon
concept that defines a one-way function
betweentwo sets [2]. A global trapdoor is an
information collectionmechanism in which
intermediate nodes may add informationelements,
such as node IDs, into the trapdoor. Only
certainnodes, such as the source and destination
nodes can unlockand retrieve the elements using
pre-established secret keys.The usage of trapdoor
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requires an anonymous end-to-end keyagreement
between the source and destination.
2.2AnonymousConnections and Onion
Routing.
It is a mechanism to provide private
communications over a public network . The
source node sets up the core of an onion with a
specific route message. During a route request
phase, each forwarding node adds an encrypted
layer to the route request message. The source and
destination nodes do not necessarily know the ID
of a forwarding node. The destination node
receives the onion and delivers it along the route
back to the source. The intermediate node can
verify its role by decrypting and deleting the outer
layer of the onion. Eventually an anonymous route
can be established.
2.3Short Group Signatures.
Group signature scheme [3] can provide
authentications without disturbing the anonymity.
Every member in a group may have a pair of
group public and private keys issued by the group
trust authority (i.e., group manager).The member
can generate its own signature by its own
privatekey, and such signature can be verified by
other members in thegroup without revealing the
signer’s identity. Only the grouptrust authority can
trace the signer’s identity and revoke thegroup
keys.
2.4Anonymous On-demand Routing Protocols
There are many anonymous routing
protocols proposed inthe past decade.The resulting
protocols include ANODR [4], [5], SDAR
[6],AnonDSR [7], MASK [8], [9], and Discount-
ANODR [10].After examining these protocols, we
find that the objectivesof unindentifiability and
unlinkability are not fully satisfied.For example,
ANODR focuses on protecting the node orroute
identities during a route discovery process,
especiallyon the routing packets. However, the
route can be identified by a disclosedtrapdoor
message, which may be released to the
intermediatenodes in backward RREP forwarding.
The other protocols relyon the neighborhood
detection and authentication, but maypartially
violate the anonymity requirementsfor
performanceconsiderations.. In A3RP [11], the
routing and data packets areprotected by a group
signature. However, the anonymous routeis
calculated by a secure hash function, which is not
as scalableas the encrypted onion mechanism.
3.Protocol Design
A. Inter Domain Routing .
We focus on the MANETs in
adversarialenvironments, where the public and
group key can be initiallydeployed in the mobile
nodes by certificate authority (CA). We assume
that there is no onlinesecurity or localization
service available when the networkis deployed.
More than one group can be done by CA. To do
communication between two groups Gateways are
selected.
Gateway selection is done based on
number of neighbours, Which node is having
more number of neighbour and more transmission
range that node elected as gateway of the group.
And in emergency situation these gateways are
used to communicate between two domains as
shown in figure(a).
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Nodes in one group will send emergency
message to gateway, since node themselves are
not able to communicate between other group
nodes. Then gateway will send message to other
groupgateway.
B. Routing Procedure within Group.
The routing algorithm can be implemented
based on theexisting on-demand ad hoc routing
protocol like ODV orDSR. The main routing
procedures can be summarized asfollows:
1) During route discovery, a source node
broadcasts anRREQ packet in the format of (1).
S→∗ : [RREQ, Nsq, VD, VSD, Onion(S)]GS - (1)
2) If an intermediate node receives the RREQ
packet, itverifies the RREQ by using its group
public key, andadds one layer on top of the key-
encrypted onion, as (2).This process is repeated
until the RREQ packet reachesthe destination or
expired.
Onion(I) = OKSI (NI ,Onion(S))                     (2)
3) Once the RREQ is received and verified by the
destinationnode, the destination node assembles
an RREP packet in the format of (3), and
broadcasts it back to
the source node.
D →∗ : (RREP,Nrt,[ Kv,Onion(J)]KJD)         (3)
4) On the reverse path back to the source, each
intermediatenode validates the RREP packet of (4)
and updates itsrouting and forwarding tables.
Then it removes one layeron the top of the key-
encrypted onion, and continuesbroadcasting the
updated RREP in the format of (5).
VSD = (Nv)Kv (4)
J →∗ : (RREP,Nrt,[Kv,Onion(I)]KIJ )   (5)
5) When the source node receives the RREP
packet, it verifiesthe packet, and updates its
routing and forwardingtables. The route discovery
phase is completed.
6) The source node starts data transmissions in the
establishedroute in the format of (6). Every
intermediatenode forwards the data packets by
using the routepseudonym.
S → D : (DATA,Nr,[Pdata]KSD) (6)
C. Routing Tables Used.
(1) Neighbour Table: This table stores
neighbour pseudonym and session key between
them, as shown in below table:
(2) Routing Table: Req.Nym stores Nsq: a
sequencenumber randomly generated by Source
for route request.Dest.Nym stores N/A : used to
identify the destination. Ver.Msg is used to store
VSD is an encrypted message for the
routevalidation at the intermediate nodes.
Next_hop will store the pseudonym of neighbour
node. as shown  below table.
4. Protocol Evaluation
In this section, we check whether AASR
can achieve theanonymity goals and defend the
above mentioned attacks.
We check three types of anonymities of
AASR, namelyidentity anonymity, route
anonymity, and location anonymity.In the
anonymity analysis, we assume that all the
nodes,including those on the discovered route, are
potential adversariesand interested in the privacy
information about the twocommunication parties
that discover the route.
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A. Identity Anonymity:
Our routing protocol can functionwithout
using the nodes’ identities. All the nodes
generaterandom nonce to indicate themselves.
Consequently, any intermediateor adversary nodes
cannot acquire the identities ofthe source and
destination nodes. Besides the tropdoor
informationdest in the RREQ packet, there is no
identity-relatedinformation involved in routing
and forwarding processes.However, in ANODR,
dest is also used in the RREPsbackward
forwarding. An intermediate malicious node can
useit to infer the destination. In AASR, we adopt
an encryptedsecret VSD as the verification
message in the RREP phase.Although Nv and Kv
will be known by the intermediate nodesin route
discovery, they are not related to the
destination’sidentity. Thus, AASR provides better
unindentifiability andunlinkability than ANODR.
B. Route Anonymity:
During the route discovery, thesource,
intermediate, and destination nodes only have
informationabout the nodes’ pseudonyms of the
previous and nexthop. Even if a node participates
in route discovery, it hasno idea about the entire
route, neither an exterior adversary.Since the
nonce of destination node is one-time
randomlygenerated and only known by its
neighborhood, it is hard forthe cooperative and
malicious nodes to infer the multi-hoproute.
C. Location Anonymity:
The packet format of AASR does
not include any information related to the network
topologyand the number of participating nodes
(such as TTL andsequence). Thus the inside
malicious node cannot infer thenetwork
topology.One potential problem of our protocol is
that the size of thekey-encrypted onion may
increase with the number of hopsalong the RREQs
broadcasting path. By assuming a
maximumnumber of hops, and fixed message size,
and random TTLtechnique [11], [12], such
problem can be resolved. Due tothe space limit,
we do not present the details here. Withthe
deployment of the technique, the external
malicious node
cannot infer the hop count by observing the packet
size
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we design an
anonymoussecure routing protocol for Inter-
domain MANETs in adversarial
environments.The route request packets are
authenticated by group signatures,which can
defend the potential active anonymous
attackswithout unveiling the node identities. The
key-encrypted onionrouting with a route secret
verification message is designedto not only record
the anonymous routes but also preventthe
intermediate nodes from inferring the real
destination.It also provides better supportfor the
secure communications that are sensitive to packet
lossratio.
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